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Stove's article, 'So you think you are a Darwinian?'" was essentially 
an advertisement for his book, Darwinian Fairytales.2 The central 
argument of the book is that Darwin's theory, in both Darwin's 
and recent sociobiological versions, asserts many things about the 
human and other species that are known to be false, but protects 
itself from refutation by its logical complexity. A great number of 
ad hoc devices, he claims, are used to protect the theory. If co-oper- 
ation is observed where the theory predicts competition, then com- 
petition is referred to the time of the cave-men, or is reinterpreted 
as competition between some hidden entities like genes or abstract 
entities like populations. In a characteristic sally, Stove writes of 
the sociobiologists' oscillation on the meaning of kin altruism: 
Any discussion of altruism with an inclusive fitness theorist is, 
in fact, exactly like dealing with a pair of balloons connected by 
a tube, one balloon being the belief that kin altruism is an illu- 
sion, the other being the belief that kin altruism is caused by 
shared genes. If a critic puts pressure on the illusion balloon- 
perhaps by ridiculing the selfish theory of human nature-air is 
forced into the causal balloon. There is then an increased pro- 
duction of earnest causal explanations of why we love our chil- 
dren, why hymenopteran workers look after their sisters, etc., 
etc. Then, if the critic puts pressure on the causal balloon-per- 
haps about the weakness of sibling altruism compared with 
parental, or the absence of sibling altruism in bacteria-then the 
illusion balloon is forced to expand. There will now be an 
increased production of cynical scurrilities about parents manip- 
ulating their babies for their own advantage, and vice versa, and 
in general, about the Hobbesian bad times that are had by all. In 
this way critical pressure, applied to the theory of inclusive fit- 
ness at one point, can always be easily absorbed at another 
point, and the theory as a whole is never endangered.3 
Now, it is uncontroversial to assert that Darwinism is a logically 
complex theory, and that its relation to empirical evidence is dis- 
tant and multi-faceted. One does not directly observe chance 
1 D.C. Stove, 'So you think you are a Darwinian?', Philosophy 69, 
1994, 267-277. 
2 Darwinian Fairytales (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996). 
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genetic variations leading to the development of new species, or 
even continuous variations in the fossil record, but must rely on 
subtle arguments to the best explanation, scaling up from varieties 
to species, and so on. The strength or otherwise of these argu- 
ments, individually and collectively, is a purely logical question. It 
is therefore no answer to Stove's attack on Darwinism to ser- 
monise, as Blackburn does,4 about how disgraceful it is for 
philosophers to delve in matters that do not concern them. 
Marxists, or Freudians, or astrologers, or phrenologists are not 
allowed to 'answer' philosophers' doubts about the relation of their 
theories to the evidence by saying, 'Trust me, I'm a doctor'. 
Evolutionists have no such rights either. 
Stove's article listed ten propositions that were, he claimed, 
asserted by Darwinians, and indeed were characteristic of 
Darwinian theory, but were obviously false. The statements are all 
universal generalizations-'every organism has as many descen- 
dants as it can'; 'all communication is manipulation of signal- 
receiver by signal-sender'; 'in every species child-mortality is 
extremely high', and the like. To answer Stove, it would be initial- 
ly natural to claim that the 'all' in these statements was not seri- 
ously meant. But, obviously, that would be to fall into Stove's 
trap, since his claim is precisely that Darwinians save their theory 
by weakening contentful assertions they appear to have made. If 
they don't mean 'all', why do they say it, if not to dress up a logi- 
cally flabby theory as much more falsifiable than it is? 
Yet this is exactly the strategy Blackburn uses in attempting to 
refute Stove. The problem is most evident in his answer at the 
point where he thinks Stove has most grossly misrepresented the 
Darwinians. Stove listed as one of the 'Darwinian falsities': 
... no one is prepared to sacrifice his life for any single person, 
but ... everyone will sacrifice it (for) more than two brothers, or 
four half-brothers, or eight first-cousins.5 
Blackburn points out that the original quote began, 'To express 
the matter more vividly, in the world of our model organisms, 
whose behaviour is determined strictly by genotype, we expect to 
find that no one is prepared to sacrifice his life for any single per- 
son, but that everyone ...' He is then much scandalized at Stove's 
omission of the phrase 'in the world of our model organisms', and 
treats this correction as a full answer to Stove. 
4 S. Blackburn, 'I rather think I am a Darwinian', Philosophy 71, 1994, 
605-616. 
5 W. D. Hamilton, 'The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour', The 
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1, 1964, 1-52, at p. 16. 
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But this does not help the Darwinian evade Stove's attack. What 
is the point of 'model organisms' unless they model organisms? As 
Blackburn himself says, 'Hamilton went on to apply (my italics) 
the model to solve a famous problem for Darwinian theory: how it 
can be that in species of hymenoptera, sterile workers exist?' If 
Hamilton is speaking about a purely mathematical world of model 
organisms, then he has said nothing about biological evolution, 
while if real organisms satisfy the assumptions of the model, then 
there can be no objection to taking the predictions of the model as 
literally asserted of the organisms. It was a point not lost on Stove, 
who wrote: 
It is true I have omitted a qualification which Hamilton prefixed 
to the words just quoted: namely, '... in the world of our model 
organisms, whose behaviour is determined strictly by genotype 
...'. But Professor Hamilton could hardly object to this omission. 
For his disciples such as Dawkins constantly do the same thing: 
that is, read off the results of Hamilton's 'model', as being true 
descriptions of biological reality. No doubt the reason is, that they 
believe that the proviso-behaviour being determined strictly by 
genotype-is satisfied everywhere in fact.6 
If Stove is to be criticized for omitting the words of others, it is 
fair to ask that others criticize him only after having all his own 
words on the subject to hand. 
Of course, it is perfectly true that models do not fit real cases 
perfectly, and a degree of looseness of fit has to be allowed to any 
theory. But there is little comfort for Darwinians in this line of 
thought. To the extent that organisms do satisfy the model, to that 
extent failure of the predictions tells against the theory; and to the 
extent that organisms do not satisfy the model, to that extent 
Darwinians are asserting something apparently contentful, then 
withdrawing it under pressure. And this particular model would 
be ill-advised to compare itself with respectable mathematical 
models. In a case like Newton's theory of gravity, there is a clear 
sense of numerical approximation, and the predictions of the 
theory can be measured to be true to within so many percent. 
Nothing could be further from the situation that obtains with 
Hamilton's 'prediction'. It is not as if the model predicts that ani- 
mals will sacrifice themselves for 8 first cousins, whereas observa- 
tion shows the true figure is 8.3. The truth is more, as Stove says, 
that a robin red breast cannot tell the difference between his first 
cousin and a bit of red wool on a wire.7 




In the rest of his paper, Blackburn strives to assure us that 
Darwinian theory deals only in possible explanations, and that 
'nothing in Darwinian theory allows you to say that because some 
pattern of behaviour would increase the amount of genetic materi- 
al in future generations, therefore it will exist'. Dawkins does not 
really mean what his extreme rhetoric seems to mean, while 
Trivers' explanation of lesbianism in gulls is merely 'speculative', 
and it is quite easy for Darwinism to explain why some species 
have low birthrates, even though they are trying to maximize their 
descendants. All of which is true, and confirms Stove's central 
thesis that Darwinism can 'explain' anything. It is sad that he is no 
longer around to enjoy such 'refutation'. 
University of New South Wales 
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